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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUPREME COURT DELINEATES
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FOURTH AND
FIFTH AMENDMENTS
In Schmerber v. California the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
admissibility of blood test evidence procured without consent of
the accused. Rejecting petitioner's fourth and fifth amendment
claims, the Court utilized a refined definition of the privilege
against self-incrimination in determining the reasonableness of in-
tracorporeal search and seizure. Moreover, the approach taken
by the majority arguably presages the demise of the mere evidence
rule.
T i CONsTITIONAL standards governing the extent to which the
government, in search of evidence, may intrude into the body of a
criminally accused have not been'defined clearly. Until the fourth
and fifth amendments became specifically applicable to the states,'
the constitutionality of intracorporeal searches was measured in terms
of the general due process standards of the fourteenth amendment.2
However, the imposition of the particular mandates of the fourth
and fifth amendments produced a problematical effect in light of the
Supreme Court's failure to develop certain substantive aspects of
these amendments.3 This failure may be due at least in part to the
confusion inherent in the line of decisions derived from Boyd v.
United States.4 In that case the Supreme Court held that the search
' Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), applied fifth amendment self-incrimination
standards to the states and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), required them to con-
form to the fundamental criteria of the fourth amendment.
2 See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
(1952).
8 The Supreme Court has consistently refused to grant certiorari in federal border
search cases involving searches where the fourth and fifth amendments arguably were
applicable. See Lane v. United States, 321 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 936 (1964); Bible v. United States, 314 F.2d 106 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 862 (1963); Murgia v. United States, 285 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 977 (1961); Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 356 U.S. 914 (1958); United States v. Michel, 158 F. Supp. 34 (S.D. Tex. 1957),
aff'd sub nom: King v. United States, 258 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 939 (1959); Note, 115 U. PA. L. Rxv. 276 (1966).
'116 U.S. 616 (1886). Another possible explanation for the Court's hesitancy lies
in the fact that the federal cases, involving "border searches," required decisions as to
whether such searches might be justified notwithstanding the employment of less
stringent standards of protection than otherwise required under the fourth and
fifth amendments. See note 65 infra.
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for and seizure of evidence within an accused's possession might well
result -in compelling the accused to be a witness against himself,
thus violating his privilege against self-incrimination. 5 If this were
true, reasoned that Court, then the search itself must be unreason-
able ab initio, and therefore a violation of the fourth amendment.6
Since that decision, the scope of the fifth amendment and its relation-
ship to the fourth have been singularly muddled areas of constitu-
tional law.7 Recent Supreme Court scrutiny of certain phases of
the fourth" and fifth amendments9 made inevitable a redefinition of
the relationship between the two amendments. The opportunity for
clarification was presented in Schmerber v. California,° where the
Court held that the introduction into evidence of a blood sample
taken over the accused's verbal protest neither forced him to be a
witness against himself" nor constituted an unreasonable search and
seizure of his person.' 2 Implicit in the Court's analysis of the fourth
and fifth amendments was a rejection of the "mere evidence" rule as
a fourth amendment concept governing the type of evidence which
may be acquired in a search.'8
The petitioner in Schmerber was arrested for driving while in-
toxicated.'4 Pursuant to the arresting officer's direction, a hospital
physician extracted a sample of the petitioner's blood for analysis de-
spite the latter's objections.' 5 At trial, the results of the blood analysis
5 116 U.S. at 633.
Old. at 633, 634-35.
7 See, e.g., Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination
Clause, 29 MICH. L. RlEv. 1, 13-27 (1930); Shellow, The Continuing Vitality of the
Gouled Rule: The Search for and Seizure of Eyidence, 48 MARQ. L. REv. 172 (1964);
Comment, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 355, 359-70 (1966); Note, 54 GEo. L.J. 593 (1966); Com-
ment, 13 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 857 (1966); Comment, 20 U. CHI. L. Rlv. 319 (1953).
8 See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
9 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964);
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964); cf. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478 (1964).
20 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
"1-Id. at 765.
12 Id. at 772.
18 See notes 101-08 infra and accompanying text.
24 Petitioner's prosecution was instituted pursuant to CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 23102 (a),
which makes it a misdemeanor to drive while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor.
5 Discovery of petitioner's intoxicated condition was occasioned by his having been
injured in an accident. Indicia of intoxication which had been observed by the investi-
gating officer were still noticeable two hours later at the hospital where petitioner was
actually arrested. The officer then requested that petitioner submit to a blood test.
On the advice of counsel, he refused, but the testing was nevertheless carried out by
the examining physician at the arresting officer's direction. 384 U.S. at 758-59, 768-69.
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were admitted into evidence over the petitioner's claim that the blood
was obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure and that the in-
troduction of the results against him violated his privilege against
self-incrimination. The conviction was affirmed on appeal 16 and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari 17 to assess the limitations upon
the blood extraction procedure imposed through the extension of
fourth and fifth amendment standards to the states.18  A majority
of the Court denied petitioner's self-incrimination claim because the
blood test evidence was not acquired by compelling him to com-
municate.19 Having determined that the fifth amendment did not
preclude obtaining this evidence from within the accused's body, the
majority viewed the fourth amendment as requiring that there be
sufficient cause to seek the desired evidence and that reasonable
procedures be utilized to obtain it.20 The Court concluded that the
petitioner's visible manifestations of intoxication constituted suffi-
cient cause for the arresting officer to invoke a commonplace, hygienic
procedure to procure evidence of intoxication. 2'
Evidently, the petitioner offered no physical resistance to the blood test. Even If
he had done so, however, the Court intimated that its constitutional analysis would
have been unaffected by this additional factor unless improper or undue force had
been used to reduce the petitioner to submission. See id. at 760 n.4.
16 See id. at 759 n.3.
17382 U.S. 971 (1966).
1 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 759 (1966). In Breithaupt v. Abram, 352
U.S. 432, 434 (1957), the Court had denied petitioner's fourth and fifth amendment
claims on the ground that the amendments were inapplicable to defendants tried by
the state. See Note, 17 HASTINGS LJ. 139 (1965).
29 384 U.S. at 765 (Brennan, Clark, and White, JJ.), 772 (Harlan and Stewart, JJ.,
concurring). Mr. Justice Black wrote a dissenting opinion in which he asserted that
the result reached by the majority was illogical and indefensible because testimony
obtained from the analysis of forcibly extracted blood was just as "communicative" or
"testimonial" as the compelled production of incriminatory papers which the majority
had held to be within the privilege. Id. at 775, 778 (dissenting opinion). By refusing
to recognize the similarity between the two situations, the majority had, in Mr. Justice
Black's view, deviated from the mandate of prior cases which required the privilege
to be liberally construed. Id. at 775-78.
Of the four dissenters, only Mr. Chief Justice Warren relied solely upon a due
process objection, citing his dissenting opinion in Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432
(1957). See- note 28 infra. The other members of the minority, Black, Douglas, and
Fortas, JJ., relied upon both self-incrimination and due process arguments. Id. at
773-78, 778, 779.
10 Id. at 768.
2 1Id. at 770-72. The Court also denied petitioner's due process daim on the
authority of Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 43, (1957). 384 U.S. at 759-60. See notes
27-29 infra and accompanying text.
In addition, the Court summarily rejected petitioner's assertion that he had been
denied his sixth amendment right to counsel. The Court reasoned that since the fifth




The first Supreme Court case involving a state's attempt to
acquire evidence from within a suspect's body was Rochin v. Cali-
fornia.2 2 In that case, police officers illegally entered the accused's
home and attempted to force him to regurgitate pills which had been
swallowed upon the officers' appearance. Failing this, the suspect
was taken to a hospital where a "stomach pump" was utilized to
recover morphine capsules. In reversing Rochin's conviction for
illegal possession of narcotics, the Supreme Court characterized the
police action as conduct which "shocks the conscience," 23 violating
the community's "sense of fair play," 24 and therefore held that the
petitioner's right to due process under the fourteenth amendment
had been abridged.25 In dictum the Court analogized the procure-
ment of evidence from within the body to coerced confessions, stating
that it would not take the inconsistent position that "in order to
convict a man the police cannot extract by force what is in his mind
but can extract what is in his stomach." 26
The efficacy of Rochin was diminished, however, by the Court's
subsequent decision in Breithaupt v. Abram.27  There the Court
held that a blood test conducted upon an unconscious driver was not
a violation of due process since blood tests were ordinary, everyday
occurrences which did not offend the community's "sense of decency
and faimess." 28 Rochin was distinguished on the grounds that there
the fact that he was compelled to do so against his will and contrary to the advice of
counsel was not a denial of counsel. 384 U.S. at 765-66. See Ruffin, Intoxication
Tests and the Bill of Rights: A New Look, 2 CAiUF. WE'srms L. Rlv. 1, 39 (1966).
22 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
22 Id. at 172. This criterion failed to survive as a lest of due process. In Irvine
v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1954), the Court held that a standard which at-
tempted to discriminate between "mild" and "serious" shocks to the conscience was
too indefinite to offer protection for constitutional rights.
21342 U.S. at 173.
2" Id. at 173-74.
2 Id. at 173.
27 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
28"d. at 436. Mr. Chief Justice Warren dissented on the ground that the nature
of the tests, invasion into the body, was the same in both Rochin and Breithaupt.
He argued that both stomach pump and blood tests are common and accepted ways
of obtaining body fluids and both tests had been performed by hospital physicians.
The only difference was the "personal reaction" of the majority to the tests, which
should not be a sufficient grounds for denying the accused his constitutional rights.
Id. at 441-42. Mr. Justice Douglas believed- that the majority in Breithaupt sanctioned
an assault by the police upon the accused. Id. at 444. Due process, in his opinion,
was violated by the compelled extraction of body fluids as well as by "involuntary
extraction of words from the accused's lips .... .. " Id. at 443. The dissents in
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the entire course of police action, beginning with the illegal entry
into the accused's home, was wrongful and the brutality of police
coerciveness a violation of due process. Prior to Schmerber v.
California these two cases provided the only Supreme Court standards
for constitutional limitations upon intrusions into the body. 0
SELF-INCRIMINATION
Before the adoption of the fifth amendment, a privilege against
self-incrimination was well established in the English common law.81
Under English practice, the privilege was merely an evidentiary rule 2
which prohibited the admission of evidence obtained by the "em-
ployment of legal process to extract from a person's own lips an
admission of guilt, which would thus take the place of other evi-
dence.138 The framers of the fifth amendment apparently intended
to incorporate this historical definition into the amendment to
protect a defendant from being compelled to give testimony against
himself in a criminal proceeding.34 The Supreme Court, however,
Schmerber were predicated to a large degree upon these dissents in Breithaupt.
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966) (Warren, Cj., dissenting); id. at 778
(Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 779 (Fortas, J., dissenting). See Note, 35 FoRDHAm L.
REv. 131 (1966).
29352. U.S. at 435-36. A few commentators have indicated that Rochin may still
be authority for the proposition that a compulsory "stomach pump" is per se violative
of due process. See Note, 85 FoRDn M L. REv. 131, 136-37 (1966); Note, 115 U. PA. L.
REv. 276, 280-88 (1966). However, the case law, as evolved by the courts of appeals
in the context of border searches, is otherwise. See, e.g., Blefare v. United States,
362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966), and cases cited therein at 875.
so See Note, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 139 (1965).
"'See generally Corwin, supra note 7, at 2-12; Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1949); 8 WIGIMORE, EVIDENCE §§2250-51 (Mc-
Naughton rev. ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as WIOMORE].
82 See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106 (1908); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S.
591, 597 (1896); SUTHEuIAND, NoTEs ON UNITE STATES CONSTITUTION 639 (1904); Gris-
wold, The Right to be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 216, 223 (1960).
8 8 WIGMORE § 2263, at 378. (Emphasis in original.)
"1 The precise intent of the amendment's authors is unclear. The language itself-
"No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self," U.S. CONSr. amend. V-suggests an application limited to criminal proceedings.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 526-27 (1966) (White, J., dissenting); 8 WIGMoRE
§ 2252, at 324. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 285 (1936). But see Corwin, supra
note 7, at 12.
The impetus for the development of the privilege against self-incrimination arose
from opposition to the oath ex officio employed by the English Court of the Star
Chamber in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Under that oath, an individual
could be questioned concerning any of his activities or beliefs and then be convicted
on the basis of such testimony. GiuswoLD, THE FitrH AMENDMENT TODAY 2-7 (1955).
The Puritan heritage of persecution under the oath and the Royal Governors' use
of the prerogative courts to uncover sedition among the colonists resulted in the
[Vol. 1967: 366
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has not been content to confine the protections of the privilege to
those situations covered by the literal words of the Constitution.
Rather, the Court has viewed the privilege in terms. of the broad
policies it seeks to effectuate3 5 and has applied it to protect witnesses
appearing before grand juries, legislative committees, and judicial
bodies3 6 and persons detained in police custody.3 7 While it has thus
been clear that an accused's oral responses may be privileged,
whether non-verbal evidence may also be elicited has been the sub-
ject of controversy3 8 The first Supreme Court case to consider -the
constitutional implications of the privilege, Boyd v. United States,39
involved compelling the defendant to produce incriminating papers
appearance of the privilege in colonial and federal constitutions. Pittman, The
Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in
America, 21 VA. L. REv. 763, 769-89 (1935). See generally MAYERs, SHALL WE AMEND
THE FiFTH AMENDMENT? 9-19, 218-23 (1959); 8 WIGMORE §§ 2250-51; Corwin, supra
note 7, at 2-12; Fortas, The Fifth Amendment: Nemo Tenetur Prodere Seipsum, 25
CEav. B.J. 91, 96-97 (1954); Morgan, supra note 31, at 1-23.
There is some evidence from the brief discussion of the amendment at the time of
its adoption that at least some of the supporters of the privilege thought of it in terms
of the privilege against coerced confessions obtained by physical force in extrajudicial
proceedings. See Pittman, supra at 788.- Both the judicial and extrajudicial aspects of
the privileges were finally integrated in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), and
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
83 The most recent enumeration of the general goals of the self-incrimination privi-
lege is found in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964), where the Court
stated that the privilege "reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble
aspirations: our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma
of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than
an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements
will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which
dictates 'a fair state-individual balance by requiring the government to leave the indi-
vidual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the gov-
ernment in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load'; our respect for
the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each individual 'to a
... private life'; our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that the
privilege, while sometimes 'a shelter to the guilty,' is often 'a protection to the
innocent.'" Id. at 55. See generally McNaughton, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimi-
nation, 51 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 138 (1960).
30 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (referee appointed by state court); Murphy
v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964) (bistate body established under interstate
compact); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955) (legislative committee); Mc-
Carthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924) (judicial proceedings concerning bankruptcy);
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892) (grand jury); Comment, 65 COLUM. L.
REv. 681-82 (1965); Comment, 1967 DuKE L.J. 97, 111-20.
37 In its most expansive application, the fifth amendment renders inadmissible
statements procured during interrogation from a suspect unaware of his right to remain
silent and to have the assistance of counsel. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 (1966).
8 See, e.g., Comment, 66 CoLUM. L. REv. 355, 359-70 (1966); Comment, 13
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 857 (1966).. -
-D 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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in court.40 In reversing the defendant's conviction as violative of
the fourth and fifth amendments, Boyd expanded the privilege to
protect forms of self-incrimination other than those involving com-
pelled testimony: the Court was unable to find any significant differ-
ence between compelling the production of incriminating papers
and exacting a confession of guilt from the witness stand.41 The
thrust of the Court's analogy indicated that as a general proposition
the accused could not be forced to be the source of incriminating
evidence.4
Nevertheless, the full implication of the Boyd analogy was tacitly
rejected by a later Court as "an extravagant extension of the 5th
Amendment. '43 Holt v. United States44 involved a contention that
the Government's compelling a defendant to model a coat found at
the scene of the crime forced him to give evidence against himself.45
However, the Court dismissed this objection by reasoning that the
privilege against self-incrimination was designed merely to prohibit
the extortion 6f communications from an accused and not to preclude
the prosecution's use of "the body as evidence when it may be
material."4
On the basis of the Holt decision, lower courts subsequently
formulated a distinction between "testimonial" and "real" evidence
obtained from an accused in order to determine the applicability of
the privilege.47 The operative assumption was that only the former
to The statute which was held unconstitutional in Boyd, Act of June 22, 1874, ch.
391, § 5, 18 Stat. 186, allowed district courts to issue subpoenas compelling the produc-
tion of papers allegedly containing evidence of contraband activity in importing. If the
accused did not produce the papers, the allegations were taken as confessed.
"11116 U.S. at 633-37.
,2 Id. at 633, 634-35, 637. The Boyd Court stated, however, that the self-incrimina-
tion privilege was inapplicable where instrumentalities, contraband, or stolen property
were seized because, in such cases, the state had a prior possessory interest. Id. at 623-24.
See note 76 infra.
'- Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1910).
"218 U.S. 245 (1910).
5 Brief for Plaintiff in Error, Holt v. United States, 54 L. Ed. 1021, 1025 (1910); see
218 U.S. at 252-53.
'Old. at 253.
"I See, e.g., United States v. Chibbaro, 861 F.2d 365 (3d Cir. 1966); United States
ex rel. Stovall v. Denno, 355 F.2d 731 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 384 U.S. 1000 (1966);
Kennedy v. United States, 353 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Caldwell v. United States, 338
F.2d 385 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 984 (1965); Blackford v. United States,
247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 914 (1958); Bratcher v. United
States, 149 F.2d 742 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 885 (1945); Swingle v. United
States, 151 F.2d 512 (10th Cir. 1945); Hartzell v. United States, 72 F.2d 569 (8th Cir.
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type of evidence, which subsumed a defendant's revelations of knowl-
edge, was protected; while the latter category, involving merely physi-
cal evidence, was not within the privilege. Accordingly, the federal
cases have held that line-up 48 and individual identifications, 49 physi-
cal examinations, 50 fingerprints, 51 voice identifications,52 and writing
exemplars53 involve eliciting real or non-testimonial evidence'from
an accused and thus in no way contravene the fifth amendment. 4
The relatively few federal cases dealing with evidence taken from
within the accused's body have reiterated the "real-testimonial"
distinction.55 In Blackford v. United States,56 for example, the Ninth
1934); United States v. Kelley, 55 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1932); 8 WIGMORE § 2265, at 386;
cf. Palmer v. Peyton, 359 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1966), 19 STAN. L. Rxv. 479 (1967). But see
Wade v. United States, 358 F.2d 557 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 385 U.S. 811 (1966). See
generally 8 WiGMoRE § 2265.
18 Rigney v. Hendrick, 355 F.2d 710 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 975
(1966). But see Wade v. United States, supra note 47.
"' United States ex tel. Stovall v. Denno, 355 F.2d 731 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 384
U.S. 1000 (1966).
"' McFarland v. United States, 150 F.2d 593 (D.C. Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326
U.S. 788 (1946).
61 United States v. Kelley, 55 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1932).
52 United States v. Chibbaro, 361 F.2d 365 (3d Cir. 1966).
11 Hartzell v. United States, 72 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1934).
5 See generally Orfield, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Federal Cases,
25 U. PITT. L. REv. 503 (1964).
All states, operating independently of federal constitutional mandates, have recog-
nized the privilege against self-incrimination. The great majority have viewed the
privilege in terms of Wigmore's "testimonial" criterion. See, e.g., State v. Berg, 76
Ariz. 96, 259 P.2d 261 (1953); Commonwealth v. Musto, 348 Pa. 300, 35 A.2d 307 (1944);
8 WIGa oIE § 2265.
Several jurisdictions have adopted and then seemingly discarded an extension of the
testimonial or communicative rule, holding that the privilege applies to all compelled
acts which involve the accused's active participation in creating the evidence. Compare
Apodaca v. State, 140 Tex. Crim. 593, 146 S.W.2d 381 (1940), with Skaggs v. State,
167 Tex. Crim. 254, 319 S.W.2d 310 (1958). Compare State v. Taylor, 213 S.C. 330, 49
S.E.2d 289 (1948); People v. Graves, 64 Cal. 2d 208, 211, 411 P.2d 114, 116, 49 Cal. Rptr.
386, 388 (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 883 (1966). At least one state has
relied upon the accuracy of the identification procedure involved, namely fingerprints, to
determine whether the privilege should apply. Lester v. State, 416 P.2d 52 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1966).
5 Insofar as intracorporeal searches are concerned, nearly all states allow the ex-
traction of blood samples to determine intoxication. See Note, 18 STAN. L. Rxv. 243
n.3 (1965); see also Slough & Wilson, Alcohol and the Motorist: Practical and Legal
Problems of Chemical Testing, 44 MINN. L. REv. 673 (1960). When faced with a
claim of self-incrimination, the state courts have denied applicability of the privilege
to such tests on the basis of the real-testimonial distinction. See, e.g., People v.
Haeussler, 41 Cal. 2d 252, 260 P.2d 8 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 931 (1954); State v.
Blair, 45 N.J. 43, 211 A.2d 196 (1965); State v. Cram, 176 Ore. 577, 160 P.2d 283 (1945);
Commonwealth v. Tanchyn, 200 Pa. Super. 148, 188 A.2d 824, cert. denied, 375 U.S.
866 (1963).
" 247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 914 (1958).
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Circuit held that the introduction in evidence of narcotics which
had been forcibly extracted from the accused's rectum did not violate
his privilege against self-incrimination, since he had not been com-
pelled to testify against himself.57
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
The fourth amendment provides that a minimal standard of
"reasonableness" must be met in the exercise of governmental power
to invade the "person, houses, papers, and effects" of its citizens. 8
While "reasonableness" is necessarily a function of all the circum-
stances of a particular situation, 9 the decisions of the Supreme Court
have emphasized four factors in analyzing the reasonableness of any
search and s~izure: 60 the "probable cause" motivating the search, 61
its scope,6 2 the search procedures utilized63 and the type of evidence
sought.6 4 It is settled that a criminal suspect may be 'searched with-
57 247 F.2d at 754. The Blackford Court adopted Wigmore's view of the privilege, see
note 33 supra and accompanying text, stating that the privilege protected only against
extracting a confession from the accused's own lips. 247 F.2d at 754.
58 The primary purpose of the fourth amendment was to prevent a repetition of
the "general" warrants which had so incensed British citizens. These warrants per-
mitted general searches of homes and warehouses without a showing prior to issuance
that the government had reasonable grounds to believe that specific evidence would
be found. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 603-06 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing). The colonists experienced this form of arbitrary governmental invasion under
the infamous writs of assistance, which were nonreturnable and authorized customs
agents to enter homes, shops, and warehouses in search of contraband without prob-
able cause that such evidence would be procured. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DE-
VELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 23-106 (1939) [hereinafter cited as LASSON].
See generally Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights, and the Fourth Amendment,
1960 SuP. CT. Rtv. 46; Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evi.
dence in State and Federal Courts, 43 MINN. L. REv. 1083, 1084-1129 (1959); Reynard,
Freedom from Unreasonable Search and Seizure-A Second Class Constitutional Right?,
25 IND. LJ. 259 (1950); Way, Increasing Scope of Search Incidental to Arrest, 1959
WASH. U.L.Q. 261; Comment, 25 OHIO ST. L.J. 538 (1964); Comment, 28 U. CHI. L. lRv.
664 (1961).
so E.g., Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357-58 (1931); Chap-
man v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
60 See generally Comment, 25 OHtO ST. L.J. 538, 543-74 (1964).
G E.g., Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307
(1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Agnello v. United States, 269
U.S. 20 (1925).
62 E.g., Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 235-39 (1960); see Kremen v. United
States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957). But see Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
See generally LASSON 120; Way, supra note 58; Comment, 25 OHIO ST. L.J. 538 (1964).
03 Compare Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963), with Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961). Compare Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957), with
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
6, Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 234-35 (1960); Harris v. United States, 331
U.S. 145, 154 (1947); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 463-66 (1932); Marron v.
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out a warrant so long as the search is incident to a lawful arrest for
probable cause. 5 This exception to the general rule requiring a
warrant for searches is based on the assumption that without such a
search the accused would be free to destroy evidence in his possession
or to use concealed weapons against the arresting officer.66
The permissible scope of searches incident to a lawful arrest has
in the past included at least the surface of a suspect's body and the
material thereon.67 It has been unclear, however, whether the per-
missible "scope" of the search varies as a function of the object being
sought.6 s Blackford v. United States,69 a case involving facts analo-
United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 308-09
(1921).
05 See, e.g., Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34-35 (1963); Henry v. United States,
361 U.S. 98, 102 (1961); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 310-11 (1959); United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 72-73 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Brinegar
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,
15-16 (1948); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925); LASSON 123-26; Note, 31
ALBANY L. REV. 177 (1967); Comment, 25 OHiO ST. L.J. 538, 543-62 (1964).
Probable cause for an arrest and search incident thereto exists when "'the facts and
circumstances within [the arresting officer's] knowledge and of which [he has] reason-
ably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reason-
able caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is being committed." Brinegar
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (quoting from Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925).
Mere suspicion of criminality will not suffice for an ordinary search. See, e.g.,
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 112-16 (1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
479-84 (1963); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29 (1927). However, Congress
has indicated, through its power to regulate unlawful importation of goods into the
United States, that mere suspicion is sufficient for the search of a person thought to
be smuggling. Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1966), and cases
cited therein. See generally Kamisar, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A
Professor's View, 44 MINN. L. Rxv. 891, 933-34 (1960). The lower courts have held
that this mere-suspicion standard is sufficient to allow entry into the body in search
of contraband. See Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870, 874-76 (9th Cir. 1966);
authorities cited note 3 supra. The Supreme Court has given some support to this
view by holding that a lesser degree of probable cause will be demanded in a general
border search than in the search of houses, papers, or effects. See Preston v. United
States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); cf. United
States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 585 (1948).
For the effect of Schmerber upon a decision involving smuggling through the use
of a body cavity, see Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703, 710-11 (9th Cir. 1966); note
110 infra.
0"Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 236 (1960); Marron v. United States, 275
U.S. 192, 199 (1927); Agnello v. United Statbs, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925); People v. Chiagles,
237 N.Y. 193, 142 N.E. 583 (1923) (Cardozo, J.).
07 Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364
(1964); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S.
20 (1925); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); People v. Chiagles, supra note
66.
at At least three commentators intimated that blood tests might be held unconstitu-
tional because of the Court's increasingly liberal view of the scope of the Bill of
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gous to the withdrawal of blood samples, indicated that the scope of
a search was limited only to the extent that the place of secretion was
accessible by reasonable methods of search: "if the culprit is 'caught
with the goods'" the Government may seize that evidence from
wherever secreted.7 0
Breithaupt v. A bram,71 used for analogy in the Blackford court's
analysis of scope limitations, also provides analogous precedent for
determining what methods may reasonably be employed to obtain
evidence from within the body. The Blackford court utilized the
fourteenth amendment due process test of Breithaupt72 as the pre-
liminary basis for determining the reasonableness of the means of
search under fourth amendment criteria.73
Perhaps the most stringent and confusing limitation on govern-
mental search and seizure is the so-called "mere evidence" rule, ac-
cording to which a search may never be instituted to seek anything
but contraband or fruits or instrumentalities of a crime within the ac-
cused's possession.74 This rule was first formally articulated in Gouled
v. United States,75 wherein the Court considered the allegation
that a defendant's private papers could not properly be sought under
a search warrant. The Gouled Court held that such a search was
unreasonable unless the Government could assert a "primary right"
in the materials sought. Their seizure and introduction into evi-
dence was otherwise no different from a requirement that the
Rights. See Ruffin, supra note 21, at 16-20; Note, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1009, 1013-14
(1966); Note, 18 STAN. L. REv. 243, 256 (1965). However, others felt that a Breithaupt
situation would result in affirmance of the validity of blood tests. See Note, 17
HASTNGs LJ. 139 (1965). See generally Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional
Litigation, 1960 Sup. CT. REv. 75.
"9 247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 914 (1958). See notes 56-57
supra and accompanying text.
70 247 F.2d at 749. See generally Way, supra note 58.
'- 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
2See notes 27-29 supra and accompanying text.
73 247 F.2d at 750-52. The Ninth Circuit in Blackford noted that the reasonableness
criterion for the fourth amendment is stricter than the due process test of Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). See notes 23-25 supra and accompanying text. Thus,
the court stated that "there may be, we conceive, conduct which, while unreasonable is
not so unconscionable that it 'shocks the conscience' or 'offend[s] a sense of justice.'"
247 F.2d at 750. Nevertheless, continued the court, the Supreme Court's decisions in
Rochin and Breithaupt "furnish the most helpful judicial guide" in determining the
reasonableness of methods used to procure evidence from within the body. Id. at 751.
However, other cases have treated the fourth amendment and due process standards
as equivalents. See Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870, 875-76 (9th Cir. 1966).
7, See cases cited note 64 supra.
Is 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
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defendant himself produce the evidence in violation of his fifth
amendment privilege7 6 The Supreme Court has since indicated that
'O1d. at 311. The mere evidence rule is derived from the holding in Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). See notes 4-6 supra and accompanying text. That
case posited an "intimate relationship" between the fourth and fifth amendments to
the extent that a search for and seizure of certain evidence may be no different from
requiring an accused to testify against himself thus violating his fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. Since the search for such inculpatory material
is thereby rendered unreasonable, a violation of the fourth amendment is also estab-
lished. The Court did, however, distinguish the situation where the Government had
a superior right of possession-for example, in the case of stolen goods, contraband,
and the instrumentalities of the crime. 116 U.S. at 623, 633.
Thus the basis of the mere evidence rule was originally thought to be a property
concept. However, the property theory fails to explain why police can seize evidence
which belongs to the accused such as weapons or instrumentalities of crime. People
v. Thayer, 63 Cal. 2d 635, 408 P.2d 108, 47 Cal. Rptr. 780 (1965) (Traynor, J.),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 908 (1966); Comment, 66 COLUm. L. Rxy. 355, 362-63 (1966);
Comment, 20 U. Cm. L. REv. 319, 323-24 (1953); cf. Jones v. United States, 362 U'S. 257,
265-66 (1960).
Other theories which have been utilized to explain the rule are based upon the
fourth and fifth amendments. The fifth amendment rationale that the accused is forced
to incriminate himself by being the unwilling source of his own conviction is applicable
only in a situation where the individual is compelled to produce evidence against
himself as in Boyd. See notes 92-94 infra; Comment, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 355, 362 (1966).
However, in this instance the fifth amendment alone, without the aid of the "mere
evidence" rule, is sufficient to prohibit the admission of such evidence. Comment, 20
U. CHI. L. Rxv. 319, 324-26 (1953); Comment, 13 U.C.LA.L. Rav. 857, 863-86 (1966).
But see Note, 54 GEO. L.J. 593, 605-06 (1966).
The fourth amendment rationale is that the mere evidence rule serves to protect
the privacy of the individual by keeping personal effects free from governmental
scrutiny. This is not an acceptable explanation of the rule, however, because it has
failed to limit the scope of searches incident to arrests. Comment, 66 COLUm. L. REV.
355, 367-68 & nn. 78-85 (1966). See also Note, 54 GEo. L.J. 593, 598, 605 (1966); Com-
ment, 13 U.C.LA.L. REV. 857, 859-63 (1966). One of the major reasons for this failure
is that frequently the police are not able to determine whether the evidence will be
considered to be "mere" evidence or an instrumentality of the crime and therefore ad-
missible. See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927) (utility bills held
admissible as "convenient" and "closely related" evidence of crime).
The rule has been criticized by the great majority of commentators. See 8 WIGMORE
§ 2184 (a); Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual Liberties: Some "Facts" and "Theories,"
53 J. Cium. L., C. & P.S. 171, 177 (1962); Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A No Man's Land
in the Criminal Law, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 474, 477-79 (1961); Shellow, The Continuing
Vitality of the Gouled Rule: The Search for and Seizure of Evidence, 48 MARQ. L. REv.
172, 175 (1964); Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUXE L.J.
319, 330-31; Comment, 66 CoLumt. L. Rav. 355, 359, 370 (1960); Comment, 25 OHio ST.
L.J. 538, 556-57 (1964).
Few commentators have supported the rule, and then only with qualifications. See
Ruffin, Intoxication Tests and the Bill of Rights: A New Look, 2 CAL.F. WESTERN L.
Rzv. 1, 9-16 (1966); Comment, 13 U.C.LA.L. Rav. 857, 861-63 (1966); Note, 54 GEo.
L.J. 593, 605-06 (1966).
Three state courts have recently repudiated the mere evidence rule, holding that it is
not a constitutional mandate (at least upon the property theory) but rather a federal
rule of evidence promulgated under the Supreme Court's supervisory powers. See
People v. Thayer, supra; State v. Bisaccia, 45 N.J. 504, 213 A.2d 185 (1965); People v.
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the mere evidence rule is applicable to the search of a person inci-
dent to lawful arrest. 77
Since the mere evidence rule as an application of the fourth
and fifth amendments, in theory, denies admissibility to evidence
other than instrumentalities, contraband, or stolen property-no
matter how relevant 78 -lower courts have been ambivalent in their
interpretation and manipulation of it. Some of the lower courts have
applied the rule in its strictest form. 79 On the other hand, at least
one court has gone to the extreme of finding an accused's shoes to be
the "instrumentalities" of a crime in order to avoid the prohibitions
of the rule and admit relevant material in evidence.8 0 Other courts
have recognized the futility of attempting to classify evidence in this
manner and have held relevant evidence admissible notwithstanding
the rule.8 1
Carroll, 38 Misc. 2d 630, 238 N.Y.S.2d 640 (Sup. Ct. 1963). Contra, Hayden v. Warden,
366 F.2d 647 (4th Cir.) (rule a constitutibnal mandate), cert. granted, 385 U.S. 926
(1966).
However, even if the mere evidence rule is found to be without a constitutional basis,
it would still be applicable to federal law enforcement in the form of Fa. R. Cpar. P.
41 (b), which would still be in effect through the Supreme Court's supervisory powers.
See generally Note, 54 GEO. L.J. 593 (1966).
7 Note, 54 Gao. L.J. 593, 616 (1966). In United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452,
464 (1932), the Court denied admissibility'to bills and ledgers recording a crime, on the
grounds that the search was exploratory and general, but added, in dictum, that the
authority to search incident to arrest was no greater than that to search under a
warrant. Fifteen years later, Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 154 (1947), upheld
a search incident to a valid arrest which resulted in discovery of incriminatory mate-
rial in his home, the Court stating, again in dictum, that "mere evidence" could not be"
seized incident to a lawful arrest.
But see Margeson v. United States, 361 F.2d 327 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 830
(1966), holding that it was unnecessary to reach the question of whether shoes taken
from a robber were instrumentalities of the crime since they were relevant evidence
seized incident to a lawful arrest. Id. at 328 S. n.8. The First Circuit thus upheld
the district court's contention that the mere evidence rule had never 'been applied
to searches incident to a lawful arrest. United States v. Margeson, 246 F. Supp. 219,
224 (D. Me. 1965).718 E.g., Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921); Hayden v. Warden, 363 F.2d
647 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 385 U.S. 926 (1966); United States v. Loft on Sixth Floor,
182 F. Supp. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). See People v. Thayer, 63 Cal. 2d 635, 408 P.2d 108, 47
Cal. Rptr. 781 (1965) (Traynor, J.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 908 (1966).
79 Hayden v. Warden, supra note 78; Takahashi v. United States, 143 F.2d 118 (9th
Cir. 1944); United States v. Stem, 225 F. Supp. 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); United States v. Loft
on Sixth Floor, supra note 78.
80 United States v. Guido, 251 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 950 (1958).
81 See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); Golliher v. United States, 362
F.2d 594 (8th Cir. 1966); United States v. Boyette, 299 F.2d 92 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 844 (1962); King v. Pinto, 256 F. Supp. 522 (D.N.J. 1966); United States v.
Pardo-Bolland, 229 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); State v. Raymond, 142 N.W.2d




In Schmerber v. California,2 the Court was faced with the prob-
lem of explicating the relationship between the fourth and fifth
amendments as set forth by the Boyd and Gouled cases. In resolving
this difficulty, Schmerber modified Boyd and Gouled to the extent
that it holds not that the fourth and fifth amendments are equiva-
lent83 in their protections but rather that the fifth amendment limits
that which may reasonably be sought and seized under the fourth.8 4
By carefully defining the scope of the fifth amendment; the Court
obviated the mere evidence rule.
The major difficulty faced by the Court with regard to the fifth
amendment lay in properly defining "self-incrimination" so as to
avoid the unrealistic strictures of a "from the accused's own mouth"8 5
formula and the equally unrealistic liberality of the approach sug-
gested by the petitioner in Holt v. United States.8 The Court's
articulation of this definition carefully delineated the history and
aims of the privilege and noted that its coverage does not fully en-
compass the "complex of values it seeks to preserve."8 7 Thus, while
the broad aims of the privilege may be said to involve the protection
of the privacy and integrity of the individual, 8 the Court pointed
out that history and precedent confined its protection to the situation
in which the state seeks to acquire evidence by "the simple expedient
823 84 U.S. 757 (1966)..
88 Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 306 (1921); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, 633 (1886). See notes 102-08 infra and accompanying text.
81 Conversely, the fourth amendment is a limitation upon the extent and methods
which the Government may employ in securing evidence admissible under the fifth.
This delineation of the relationship between the two amendments may be a step toward
what McNaughton states is required "surgery" for fifth amendment applicability. In
his view, the fifth should be a "complement" of probable cause, that is, the accused
should not be forced to provide the first evidence against himself. But if probable
cause does exist, then the accused should be subject to relevant inquiry, even in
judicial proceedings. See McNaughton, supra note 35, at 154. Compare, however, Mr.
Justice Fortas' view that the fifth amendment privilege is not subject to defeasance by a
showing of probable cause. Fortas, supra note 34, at 99.
85 384 U.S. at 763 n.7. See notes 47-54 supra and accompanying text.
80 218 U.S. 245. 252-53 (1910). See 384 U.S. at 761 n.5; notes 42-45 supra and accom-
panying text.
87 384 U.S. at 762.
88 See ibid. The "intimate relation" of the fourth and fifth amendments is a result
of the fact that both protect the privacy of the individual as a source of evidence and
the fifth amendment indicates one aspect of privacy which is to be protected under
the fourth. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 629 (1886); Comment, 13 U.C.LAX.
R v. 857-59 (1966).
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of compelling it from [the accused's] ... mouth."' 9 By generalizing
this statement from strictly oral to all communicative acts, the Court
arrived at a limited expansion of self-incrimination: an act, com-
municative in nature, performed by the accused, which provides
the prosecution with evidence against him.90
Though framed in terms of the doctrinaire approach character-
istic of earlier cases, the Schmerber standard is more inclusive in that
it shields the accused against being compelled to reveal either "oral"
or "physical" evidence which communicates his knowledge or be-
liefs.91 The Court, in explicating the dimensions of "communica-
tion," reaffirmed the Boyd decision on the grounds that the pro-
duction of private papers in response to a subpoena is a communi-
cative response.92 By complying with the subpoena, the accused
communicates the fact that he possesses the incriminatory material 8
which is subsequently used against him.
19 384 U.S. at 762.
?0O The Court held that the fifth amendment "relates only to acts on the part of the
person to whom the privilege applies," and not "to evidence of acts non-communicative
in nature as to the person asserting the privilege even though, as here [in forcing the
'donation' of blood] such acts are compelled to obtain the testimony of others .... "
Id. at 761 n.5. The result is a test very similar to Wigmore's conception of the mod-
ern version of the privilege: "Unless some attempt is made to secure a communication
... upon which reliance is to be placed as involving the accused's consciousness of the
facts and the operations of his mind in expressing it, the demand made upon him is
not a testimonial one." 8 WIGMORE § 2265, at 386. Consequently, although the Court
specifically refuted Wigmore's historical "from the accused's own mouth" concept, 384
U.S. at 763 n.7, it necessarily utilized the Wigmore approach to the extent that the only
things which can possibly be "communicated" are "consciousness of facts and operations
.of the mind."
Whether the privilege may be invoked therefore depends upon whether the act
compelled is itself "communicative," that is, whether it reveals the accused's knowledge,
beliefs, or emotional state. It was at this point that the majority and Mr. Justice Black
parted company. In Mr. Justice Black's view, any evidence which "communicates"
the guilt of one who is the unwilling source of that evidence is within the privilege.
Id. at 775 (dissenting opinion). The Court took note of this criticism but held that
the privilege applies only to communicative acts of the individual; otherwise all testi-
mony concerning the "petitioner's condition" would fall within the privilege. Id. at
761 n.5.
"See id. at 764.
92 Id. at 763-64.
"See Haywood v. United States, 268 Fed. 795, 802 (7th Cir. 1920); MAGUIRE, EvI-
DENCE OF GUILT 23 (1959); 8 WxcsORE § 2264, at 379; Comment, 13 U.C.LA.L. Rnv.
857. 866-70 (1966).
The Boyd case involved a subpoena directing the accused to produce certain papers
in court. Gouled applied the same reasoning as that employed in Boyd to facts in-
volving a true search and seizure under a warrant. However, because the Gouled
Court failed to distinguish between the accused's production of incriminatory evidence
-an act which verifies the possession of inculpatory material-and the situation in which
the accused is simply the unwilling source of evidence, the only explanation open
[Vol. 1967: 366
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The Schmerber majority also indicated that compelled lie-detector
tests are violative of the fifth amendment because an effort is made
"to prove guilt or innocence on the basis of physiological responses, ' 94
which communicate or verify the accused's knowledge or beliefs con-
cerning the crime in question.95 On the other hand, the extraction
of blood in Schmerber differs from compelling the production of
papers and lie-detector tests because it does not force the accused
himself to indicate his degree or knowledge of intoxication; 96 the
test does not depend upon his testimonial or communicative re-
sponses; and no reliance is placed upon his knowledge.97
to the Gouled Court for the result in Boyd was that the type of evidence produced
there (mere evidence as opposed to the instrumentality of a crime) was constitutionally
forbidden. See 255 U.S. at 308-10.
9, 384 U.S. at 764. One commentator states that it is not clear whether the in-
validity of the lie-detector test is due to the compulsion exerted in forcing the accused
to take the test or the fact that .the "communicative" reactions are made in response
to interrogation. Ruffin, supra note 76, at 38. However, it seems clear that the
former explanation cannot be valid since there was compulsion to take the test in
Schmerber. The point of differentiation between the two tests is that, in a lie-
detector test, the accused responds to interrogation with a revelation of knowledge; in
the blood test, he simply is a source of evidence-there is no response, no communica-
tion of knowledge or belief. See generally Silving, Testing the Unconscious in Criminal
Cases, 69 HARY. L. REv. 683 (1956).
95See generally INBAU, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION (3d ed. 1953).
96 See 384 U.S. at 761 n.5; State v. Cram, 176 Ore. 577, 583, 160 P.2d 283, 286-87
(1945); Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause,
29 MICH. L. REv. 1, 13-18 (1930).
9 The Court indicated that fifth amendment problems could result both from an
application or non-application of certain guilt-determining tests. If, for example, for
reasons of religion, fear, or health, an accused confessed in lieu of undergoing the
test, such a confession would be a communicative response to compulsion inherent in
the state's threat to test. 384 U.S. at 765 n.9. The Court suggested that when the
state seeks to introduce the accused's refusal to take a constitutionally sanctioned test
into evidence, "general" fifth amendment principles would apply rather than the
rule of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), which prohibits comment upon an
accused's invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination. 384 U.S. at 765 n.9.
Since the Schmerber decision was handed down, People v. Sudduth, 52 Cal. Rptr.
377 (Dist. Ct. App.), aff'd - Cal. 2d -, 421 P.2d 401, 55 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1966) has sug-
gested a disposition of an improper refusal to take a blood test. The district court
distinguished the case of a hemophiliac's confession to avoid a blood test from that
in which an accused offers to bribe an officer "not to test or to change the results of
the test." 52 Cal. Rptr. at 381. The former, said the court, presents a compulsive
situation and "any confession [the accused] ... makes in order to avoid the test would
be coerced." On the other hand, evidence of the attempted bribe would be an in-
criminating statement which would simply "permit the trier of facts to draw an in-
ference of consciousness of guilt." Ibid. The distinction here would seem to be two-
fold: (1) in the first example, there is compulsion to confess; in the second there
is no compulsion to bribe an officer; (2) in the first case there is a communication of
the evidence of his guilt; but in the second, there is merely an inference of guilt.
As an alternative line of argument, an anology could be drawn to the "right of
counsel" argument in Schmerber: where there is no constitutional right to refuse the
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
While the fifth amendment standard espoused by the majority
may produce untoward results,98 the Court nevertheless clearly re-
jected the notion that the amendment rendered an accused's body
inviolate as a source of evidence.99 After defining the scope of the
fifth amendment, the Court proceeded to delineate the relationship
between the fourth and fifth amendments in the following terms:
test, the accused cannot invoke the fifth amendment to prohibit evidence of refusal
to take the test. See 384 U.S. at 766; note 98 infra. In the case of the hemophilac,
compulsion to take the test would be a violation of due process, but with refusal
unprotected by constitutional safeguards the accused should acquire no privilege
because of this refusal. See People v. Sudduth, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
98 The Schmerber standard is not adequate for the determination of fifth amend-
ment applicability where evidence results from "implied verification." See Weintraub,
Voice Identification, Writing Exemplars and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
10 VAND. L. REv. 485, 503-08 (1957). For example, it may be presumed that in order
for a witness' voice identification to be valid there must be a correlation between the
voice spoken at the time of the crime and the impliedly normal voice spoken for
identification purposes. According to Weintraub, since speech may be controlled by the
accused "as a means of conveying ideas" any evidence resulting therefrom should be
protected by the self-incrimination privilege. Id. at 506.
In a recent decision, People v. Ellis, - Cal. 2d -, 421 P.2d 393, 55 Cal. Rptr. 385,
reversinig on other grounds 52 Cal. Rptr. 125 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966), the California Su-
preme Court determined that where such implied verification of normality exists, the
"key issue ... is the degree of reliance on the veracity of the accused." - Cal. 2d at -,
421 P.2d at 395 n.4, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 387 n.4. Mr. Chief Justice Traynor reasoned that
since (1) it was unlikely that a false identification would occur because the accused acci-
dentally disguised his voice to match that of the true criminal; and (2) since, in any
event, the factor of disguise was insignificant because "any attempt by a suspect to
disguise his voice is apt to be detected readily by those persons who can compare the
sample with his normal voice," id. at -, 421 P.2d at 395, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 387, the
"implied testimony" of the accused was not a significant factor in voice identification.
Id. at - n.4, 421 P.2d at 595 n.4, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 387 n.4. These may be fallacious
criteria for determining the applicability of the privilege, however, because the ques-
tion is not whether the accused is lying (disguising his voice) but whether he "com-
municates" either inculpatory or exculpatory information. See Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757, 761 n.5 (1966). Schmerber, however, fails to determine whether that
which communicates the status quo of a mutable characteristic, such as voice identifica-
tion, is privileged. The case law strongly supports the admissibility of such evidence.
See Fitzsimmons v. United States, 371 F.2d 1040 (10th Cir. 1967); United States v.
Chibbaro, 361 F.2d 365 (3d Cir. 1966); United States ex rel. Stovall v. Denno, 355 F.2d
731 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 384 U.S. 1000 (1966); People v. Ellis, supra; People v.
Graves, 64 Cal. 2d 208, 411 P.2d 114, 49 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
883 (1966); People v. Gilbert, 63 Cal. 2d 690, 408 P.2d 365, 47 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1965),
cert. granted, 384 U.S. 985 (1966); State v. McKenna, 35 U.S.L. -WEEK 2497 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Feb. 3, 1967). But cf. Wade v. United States, 358 F.2d 557, 559 (5th Cir.), cert.
granted, 385 U.S. 811 (1966).
On the other hand, if the same act-voice identification-were compelled for
purposes of a voiceprift rather than witness identification, any implication of normality
would be irrelevant, because even a disguised voice may be identified by voiceprints.
See N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1966, p. 1, col. 2; id., Apr. 13, 1966, p. 55, col. 8; Newsweek,
April 25, 1966, p. 30; Popular Science Monthly, Sept. 1965, p. 80. Arguably, therefore,
the voice identification in this setting is outside the privilege.
99 384 U.S. at 767.
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We begin with the assumption that once the privilege against
self-incrimination has been found not to bar compelled intrusions
into the body ... the Fourth Amendment's proper function is to
restrain, not against all intrusions as such but against intrusions
which are not justified under the circumstances or which are
made in an improper manner.-00
The clear implication of the Court's analysis is that the only limita-
tion on the type of evidence which may be obtained from an accused
is that evidence may not be seized which would be rendered in-
admissible by the self-incrimination privilege. In this manner, the
Court indirectly attempted to extricate the fourth and fifth amend-
ments from the garbled relation imposed upon them by Gouled v.
United States'0 ' in the guise of the mere evidence rule. The
Schmerber Court simply ignored the rule in the context of intra-
corporeal searches, 0 2 substituting instead the "communicative" stan-
dard of the privilege against self-incrimination as determinative of
the type of evidence which may be seized under the fourth amend-
ment. 0 3 If evidence taken from the body is not procured by com-
pulsion against the testimonial or communicative capacities of the
accused, its seizure is not unreasonable in this respect. Thus
Schmerber's fifth amendment standard replaced the dogma of the
mere evidence rule for the seizure of evidence from within the
body. 104
Furthermore, Schmerber indicates that the mere evidence rule
may also be eviscerated insofar as search and seizure of houses, papers,
and effects are concerned. The fifth amendment standard for in-
trusions into the body is much more permissive as to the types of evi-
00 1d. at 768.
101 See notes 78-80 supra and accompanying text.
102 384 U.S. at 768 (precedent "not instructive" in a search beyond the surface of
the body).
108 The Court emphasized at two different points that in the first instance it is
the self-incrimination clause which determines whether the body may be entered to
obtain blood as evidence. See notes 99-100 supra and accompanying text.
104 The fifth amendment basis of the mere evidence rule was destroyed when, in
discussing self-incrimination, the Court held that "it could not be denied that in
requiring petitioner to submit to the withdrawal and chemical analysis of his blood
the State compelled him to submit to an attempt to discover evidence that might be
used to prosecute him for a criminal offense." 384 U.S. at 761. (Emphasis added.)
Gouled had indicated that the opposite was true. "[The state's powers] . . . may not
be used as a means of gaining access to a man's house or office and papers solely for
the purpose of making search to secure evidence to be used against him a criminal,
or penal proceeding ....." 255 U.S. at 309.
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dence which may be seized than is the mere evidence rule. For
example, the search for and seizure of a diary containing the accused's
admission of crime would be prohibited under the mere evidence
rule10 5 but not under an application of the self-incrimination stan-
dard, since the seizure would not involve a communicative act by
the accused. 1 6 Thus, if the mere evidence rule continues to be
applied to extracorporeal searches and the fifth amendment standard
to those intracorporeal in nature, an anomoly results: the accused's
body is less sacrosanct than the home in which he lives.107 Because
the Court placed such heavy emphasis upon the sanctity of the
accused's body,08 it would be illogical to hold that this special
privacy, requiring the greater protection, is guarded by the lesser
standard. The resolution of the paradox requires the abandonment
205 United States v. Stern, 225 F. Supp. 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
10
o In applying the fifth amendment the real question is whether papers equal
knowledge or communication of knowledge, rather than physical evidence such as
fingerprints, simply because they are verbalizations of thoughts. While it is argu-
able that a search warrant is compulsion for the terms of the fifth amendment,
see Note, 54 GEo. LJ. 593, 605 (1966), nevertheless, if papers were seized, the mere
act of seizure should involve no verification or communication of the accused's
knowledge. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64 (1966). Compare Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), with Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298,
309 (1921) ("There is no special sanctity in papers'). As an extreme example of
the arbitrary standards promoted by the mere evidence rule, if an individual wrote
down the fact that he had committed a crime and the police seized it while searching
under a warrant, such evidence could not be admissible. See note 105 supra. How-
ever, if the same piece of paper were swallowed by an accused and then compelled
from his stomach without undue force, such evidence should be admissible against
him. The accused himself would not have been forced to produce the evidence;
the regurgitation would not have involved his testimonial capacities. See MAGUIRE,
EVIDENCE OF GUILT (1959). Cf. Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966).
Thus if Schmerber is extended to its logical conclusion, the same item could be mere
evidence when outside the body but admissible if procured by an intracorporeal search.
It might be argued that the mere evidence rule serves a valid purpose in pro-
tecting the accused's privacy by disallowing warrants in those cases where the only
objective of the search is mere evidence. However, past experience has indicated that
such a limitation would not restrict searches in practice. See Comment, 66 CoLuM. L.
REv. 355, 867 (1966); see note 76 supra. Moreover, if this argument were valid it would
appear anomalous that law enforcement officials could seize more under a search
incident to arrest or in an emergency, where there is not the restraining factor of the
independent magistrate, .than they could under a warrant. See Note, 54 GEo. L.J.
598, 615-16 (1966).
20 7 .But see Barrett, supra note 58, at 49 (the Court has traditionally accorded
greater protection to property rights than to personal rights).
108 The Court stated that "the interests in human dignity and privacy which the
Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance that
desired evidence might be obtained. In the absence of a clear indication that in fact
such evidence will be found, these fundamental human interests require law officers
to suffer the risk that such evidence may disappear unless there is an immediate
search." 384 U.S. at 769-70.
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of the mere evidence rule as a test for the reasonableness of a search
and seizure in all cases.
In delineating the relationship between the fourth and fifth
amendments, the Schmerber Court held that if the type of evidence
seized is not excluded under the fifth amendment, the legality of the
search and seizure then rests upon the existence of probable cause
and the reasonableness of the methods utilized in securing the
evidence. 109
Although acknowledging that probable cause for arrest has
been sufficient to permit a search of an accused's person, the Court
held that the dignity and privacy of the accused demand that in-
trusions beyond the surface of the body be made only when there
is a "clear indication" that the desired evidence will be secured. 110
Even then, such a search will not be permitted, without a warrant,
absent an emergency which threatens the "destruction of evi-
dence,"'' such as the quick elimination of alcohol from the blood-
stream." 2  Thus, a stricter standard of probable cause is required
100 384 U.S. at 768.
'10 384 U.S. at 769-70. (Emphasis added.) The Court had previously indicated that
there may be varying degrees of the requisite probable cause depending upon the sub-
ject of the search. Cf. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948), which held that a
search without arrest may be made of a vehicle but not of its occupants. The Court
indicated that a different degree of probable cause may be required in searches of per-
sons as opposed to personal effects or homes. Id. at 585.
A more stringent probable cause requirement for penetrating the body surface is
consistent with the Court's recent holdings: "[W]hen a search is based upon a magis-
trate's, rather than a police officer's, determination of probable cause, the reviewing
courts will accept evidence of a less 'judicially competent or persuasive character than
would have justified an officer in acting on his own without a warrant'...." Aguilar
v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964) (quoting from Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270
(1960)).
Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1966), held that "Clear indication"
occupies a niche somewhere between mere suspicion and probable cause insofar as
border searches are concerned. Therefore, a registered narcotics user who is nervous,
has recent needle marks, and is under drugs at the time of his entry into the United
States, may reasonably be thought to be smuggling narcotics in body cavities and
searched. Id. at 709-10. Schmerber suggests, however, that for intracorporeal searches,
"clear indication" is a more stringent requirement than the simple "probable cause"
requisite for extracorporeal searches. 384 U.S. at 769-70.
1 1 1 Id. at 770 (quoting from Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964)).
See also Note, 18 STAN. L. Rav. 243 (1965).
The Court's statement that "search warrants are ordinarily required," 384 U.S. at
770, gives further support to the theory that the Court may be returning to its
original position that a warrant is to be required whenever feasible. See Ruffin,
supra note 76, at 39. Compare United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), with
Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1964), and Preston v. United States, 376 U.S.
364 (1964). But see Cooper v. California, 385 US. 610 (1967).
11 Both the probable cause for the arrest and the "clear indication" for the search
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to enter the body in search of evidence than is needed to justify a
search of the body surface or its surroundings.
Another factor considered in testing the constitutionality of
the search and seizure in Schmerber was whether the methods utilized
in extracting the blood sample met the fourth amendment criteria
of reasonableness. 113 Applying a test similar to the due process
standard of Breithaupt v. A bram,"4 the Court concluded that the
blood analysis was reasonable because it is a commonplace, everyday
occurrence involving minimal risk to the accused.1 5
Finally, the Court held that the circumstances under which the
blood test is performed are relevant to a determination of the reason-
ableness of such a seizure. In Schmerber, the test was conducted by
a physician in hospital surrounding; there was no risk of unqualified
personnel or unsanitary conditions." 6 Thus, concluded the Court,
the standard of reasonableness was met and consequently there was
no violation of the accused's rights under the fourth amendment.
Although the opinion thus rendered follows the logic of history
and precedent, it nevertheless seems to reveal a change in the Court's
fifth amendment philosophy by drawing a line beyond which the
Court will not step in hedging police investigations. In Miranda v.
Arizona," 7 decided only one week before Schmerber, the Court
formulated new rules for police interrogation seemingly upon the
assumption that incriminating evidence revealed under questioning
in Schmerber were found in the smell of liquor upon the accused's breath and
"bloodshot, watery, sort of glassy appearance" of petitioner's eyes. 384 U.S. at 769.
But cf. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948) (opium fumes not sufficient as
sole probable cause for searching defendant's room without a warrant).118 See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
""' See 384 U.S. at 771-72; notes 27-28 supra and accompanying text.
116 Petitioner had also refused to submit to a breathalizer test, which represents
far less of an intrusion into the accused's person and functions with approximately
equivalent accuracy. See Slough & Wilson, Alcohol and the Motorist: Practical and
Legal Problems of Chemical Testing, 44 MiNR. L. REv. 673, 679 (1960). Although the
Court expressly declined to decide whether the accused's test preference must be re-
spected, 384 U.S. at 771, it would seem from dictum that since the petitioner did not
object on "grounds of fear, concern for health, or religious scruple," ibid., his choice
need not be respected unless an objection other than simple preference is asserted,
even though one test requires entry into the body and the other does not. See also
Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 Sup. Cr. R V. 75, 82-83.
A recent California case has indicated that a petitioner's more active cooperation in
a breathalizer test does not "communicaie" any more than does his submission to a
blood test as in Schmerber. People v. Sudduth, 52 Cal. Rptr. 377, 379-80 (Dist. Ct.
App.), aff'd, - Cal. 2d -, 421 P.2d 401, 55 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1966).
112 384 U.S. at 771-72.
117 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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by one uninformed of his rights amounts to evidence achieved by
compulsion.118 The Court thus expanded the concept of "com-
pulsion" to include even the slightest amount of inquisitorial
pressure. Having thus enlarged the ambit of compulsion to extreme
limits in Miranda, the Court was forced to determine whether it
should also amplify the substantive scope of the privilege. The
majority in Schmerber did elect amplification but to a lesser degree
than the Miranda majority had expanded the concept of com-
pulsion.
However, the philosophies underlying Miranda and Schmerber
are compatible if one accepts the statement made in both opinions
that the object of the self-incrimination privilege is to secure a "fair
State-individual balance." 19 Such a balance cannot exist where the
individual is ignorant of his right to silence and the state proceeds
to take advantage of this fact-thus the rule in Miranda. Con-
versely, equilibrium is also destroyed if an accused may prevent
state acquisition of evidence by the simple fact of its location inside
his body-thus the holding of Schmerber.
118 See id. at 457; United States v. Bell, 81 Fed. 830, 837-39 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1897).
119 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 762 (1966); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 460 (1966).
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